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WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC ON SOCIAL MEDIA? A PUSH FOR
CLEARER LANGUAGE IN THE ILLINOIS
CYBERSTALKING STATUTE
INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that anything one puts on social media becomes infi-
nitely available.1  Many social media outlets’ terms and conditions,
like those of Facebook,2 explicitly outline that these organizations
have the right to share any and all information that is posted on their
websites.3  Despite these enumerated terms and conditions, most so-
cial media users have some expectation of privacy regarding what they
post on their personal accounts.4  For example, the Facebook “friend”
option allows users to pick and choose with whom they want to share
information.5  Nevertheless, courts across the country have held that
“private” social media posts can be used as evidence in both civil and
criminal trials.6  In fact, the Third Party Doctrine explicitly mandates
1. RPT-Obama Warns U.S. Teens of Perils of Facebook, REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2009, 4:55 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0828582220090908 (“I want everybody here to be careful
about what you post on Facebook, because in the YouTube age, whatever you do, it will be
pulled up again later somewhere in your life.”).
2. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms
(last updated Jan. 30, 2015).
3. Nicole Ozer, Facebook Not as Private as You Might Think, ACLU (Aug. 28, 2007), https://
www.aclunc.org/blog/facebook-not-private-you-might-think.
4. James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2009) (“Not every-
thing posted on Facebook is public.  Users shouldn’t automatically lose their rights of privacy in
information solely because it’s been put on Facebook somewhere.”).
5. Natasha Stokes, The Complete Guide to Facebook Privacy Settings, TECHLICIOUS (July 22,
2016), http://www.techlicious.com/tip/complete-guide-to-facebook-privacy-settings/ (“[Y]ou can
include all your Friends, while excluding the names of certain Facebook friends you don’t want
seeing your updates.”).
6. Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 612, at *12–13 (Pa.
C.P. Franklin Cty. Nov. 8, 2011) (“The Court holds that no general privacy privilege protects
[defendant’s] Facebook material from discovery.  No court has recognized such privilege, and
neither will we.  By definition, there can be little privacy on a social networking website.”).
Even if plaintiff used privacy settings that allowed only his “friends” on Facebook to see post-
ings, he “had no justifiable expectation that his ‘friends’ would keep his profile private.”  United
States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  In fact, “the wider his circle of
‘friends,’ the more likely his posts would be viewed by someone he never expected to see them.”
Id.
901
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these social media organizations divulge their content to any third-
party involved in litigation.7
This Comment argues that the Illinois legislature should amend the
Cyberstalking Statute8 (the Statute) to ensure defendants are put on
notice of the possible violations and consequences of their own per-
sonal acts directed towards the victim on social media platforms, and
to ensure that victims are thoroughly protected from those harmful
actions.  Specifically, the legislature needs to provide language in the
Statute that addresses the legal ramifications of posting material, di-
rected toward the victim, on social media platforms.  Nowhere in the
current Statute does the phrase “social media” appear.9  This Com-
ment argues that Illinois’ stalking law, as it is currently written, does
not adequately inform defendants of the statutory social media restric-
tions.  This lack of information creates problems for potential viola-
tors and does not protect victims.  The law in its current form is
unclear as to which types of social media communication constitute a
violation of the “contact” or “stalking” elements of the Statute.10  To
correct this problem, the Illinois General Assembly should clear up
the misconceptions by adding a mens rea element to the Statute.
To understand why the Illinois General Assembly should amend the
current Statute, it is important to understand the background and pur-
pose of the Statute itself.  According to the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, in 2006, an estimated 3.4 million people were stalked in the
United States.11  Part II of this Comment discusses current stalking
legislation in Illinois and introduces the topic of cyberstalking.12  It
also gives insight as to how courts across the country interpret the
term “contact” in stalking statutes.  Part III analyzes different por-
tions of the Statute and discusses Illinois v. Relerford,13 the first Illi-
nois Appellate Court case to declare a portion of the Illinois
Cyberstalking Statute unconstitutional.14  Finally, Part IV explains the
7. See infra notes 234–45 and accompanying text. R
8. Cyberstalking, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.5 (2014), invalidated in part by Illinois v.
Relerford, 56 N.E.3d 489 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (holding that subsections (a)(1)–(2) were facially
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they
lacked a mens rea requirement).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. KATRINA BAUM ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 1 (2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ovw/legacy/2012/08/15/
bjs-stalking-rpt.pdf.
12. See infra notes 16–151 and accompanying text. R
13. 56 N.E.3d 489.
14. See infra notes 152–276 and accompanying text. R
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impact that the implementation of a social media and mens rea com-
ponent to the Statute will have on future litigation.15
This Comment proposes a balance between instituting a clear social
media and mens rea component into the Statute while protecting the
due process and freedom of speech rights of defendants.
II. BACKGROUND
Stalking is a form of unwanted harassment that causes a “reasona-
ble person” to feel fear.16  Stalking can include unwanted contact via
“phone, mail, and/or email.”17  It can also include following or waiting
for the victim, making direct or indirect threats to harm the victim,
damaging the victim’s property, or harassing the victim through elec-
tronic communication.18  Stalking can cause permanent physiological
and emotional damage and may also involve severe, sometimes lethal,
violence.19
Stalking is a form of domestic abuse that has become a widespread
problem.20  Batterers use stalking as a means of controlling their inti-
mate partners.21  Stalking commonly begins during a relationship, as
opposed to at its end.22  Stalking is a very serious crime,23  for which
plenty of legislation criminalizing the conduct already exists.24
15. See infra notes 277–318 and accompanying text. R
16. Stalking, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ovw/stalking (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Stalking Response Tips for Prosecutors, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/ovw/legacy/2013/01/31/tips-for-prosecutors.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
20. Stalking, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
21. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking, 23 WOMEN’S RTS.
L. REP., 243, 244 (2002).  Literature discussing stalking lends support to this proposition. See
Heather C. Melton, Stalking in the Context of Intimate Partner Abuse: In the Victim’s Words, 2
FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 347, 361 (2007).  Another leading study on stalking explained, “The
stalking partners’ control and dominance over women’s thinking and actions alienated them
from their own goals, intentions, thoughts, feelings, and it isolated them from others.” TK LO-
GAN ET AL., PARTNER STALKING: HOW WOMEN RESPOND, COPE, AND SURVIVE 135 (2006).
22. LOGAN ET AL., supra note 21 at 135. R
23. Lori G. Levin, Stalking No Contact Order Act, CATALYST (Nov. 2011), https://www.isba
.org/committees/women/newsletter/2011/11/stalkingnocontactorderact.
Victims experience fear for their safety, fear for the safety of others and suffer emo-
tional distress. Many victims alter their daily routines to avoid the persons who are
stalking them. Some victims are in such fear that they relocate to another city, town or
state. While estimates suggest that 70% of victims know the individuals stalking them,
only 30% of victims have dated or been in intimate relationships with their stalkers.
Id.
24. See IND. CODE § 35-45-10-1 (2014); IOWA CODE § 708.11 (2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.411h (2016); WIS. STAT. § 940.32 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-3\DPL302.txt unknown Seq: 4 13-SEP-17 13:03
904 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:901
A more modern form of stalking is cyberstalking25—essentially
stalking performed online26—which comes in all different forms.27
Cyberstalkers use email, messenger applications, and social media
platforms to stalk their victims.28
Celebrities have increasingly become the victims of cyberstalking.29
By viewing celebrity posts, celebrity stalkers feel like they have devel-
oped a relationship with the celebrity.30  In fact, many of these stalk-
ers believe the celebrities are talking directly to them.31  For example,
in 2012, famous model Kourtney Reppert was the victim of Facebook
stalking.32  Luis Plascencia stalked Reppert by sending her threaten-
ing and harassing messages through email and Facebook.33
25. Karen McVeigh, Cyberstalking ‘Now More Common’ than Face-to-Face Stalking, GUARD-
IAN (Apr. 8, 2011, 1:31 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/apr/08/cyberstalking-study-
victims-men (“Cyberstalking is now more common than physical harassment, according to new
figures due to be released next week, with many victims finding themselves pursued by complete
strangers online.”).
26. Marian Merritt, Straight Talk About Cyberstalking, NORTON, http://us.norton.com/cyber-
stalking/article (last visited Mar. 8, 2017) (“It has been defined as the use of technology, particu-
larly the Internet, to harass someone.  Common characteristics include false accusations,
monitoring, threats, identity theft, and data destruction or manipulation.  Cyberstalking also in-
cludes exploitation of minors, be it sexual or otherwise.”).
27. Id. (“The harassment can take on many forms, but the common denominator is that it’s
unwanted, often obsessive, and usually illegal.”).
28. Cyberstalking: What You Need to Know to Stay Safe Online, WHOISHOSTINGTHIS?, http://
www.whoishostingthis.com/resources/cyberstalking-guide/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2017) (“Cyber-
stalkers often use social media to stalk their victims.”).
29. See Nick Watt & Bonnie McLean, Celebrities and Cyberstalkers: The Dark Side of Fame in
the Internet Age, ABC NEWS (July 9, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/celebrities-cyber-
stalkers-dark-side-fame-internet-age/story?id=16741230; see also Robert Kovacik & Angelo Si-
mone, FBI: Los Angeles Model Kourtney Reppert Is Victim of Stalker, Harassment, NBC NEWS
(June 28, 2012, 9:04 AM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/06/28/12459882-fbi-los-ange-
les-model-kourtney-reppert-is-victim-of-stalker-harassment.
30. Alexandra Katehakis, Cyberstalking: Fastest Growing Crime, HUFFINGTON POST (May 6,
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alexandra-katehakis-mft/cyberstalking-fasting-growing-
crime_b_6810154.html (“Where some of us may poke our nose into Facebook a little too often,
or fanatically follow a celebrity online, a cyberstalker will go further by repeatedly sending un-
wanted anonymous messages, threats or comments, and will continue doing these things despite
repeated requests and warnings to stop.”).
31. See Kovacik & Simone, supra note 29. R
32. Id.
33. Id.; see Internet Fame Draws Cyberstalker for Model Kourtney Reppert, Others, FOX NEWS
(July 10, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2012/07/10/internet-fame-draws-cyber-
stalker-for-model-kourtney-reppert-others/ (“‘I’m going to stab you in the f—-ing heart and cut
your f—-ing head off.  I will kill your parents, cut them to pieces with a handsaw, do you f—-ing
understand me?  Don’t f—- with me or make me mad,’ one email from her stalker allegedly
read.” (alterations in original)).
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In addition to celebrities being stalked on Facebook, many ex-lov-
ers have resorted to social media in an effort to monitor old flames.34
A man from Maryland was convicted of stalking his ex-wife for setting
up fake online profiles in her name.35  The man set up fake profiles on
websites like Facebook and Craigslist, claiming to be his ex-wife.36  He
then told a man to come to her house and rape her.37  Both instances
exemplify why it is important that the legislature implement strict
cyberstalking laws to ensure that victims of online abuse are
protected.
A. Stalking Legislation in the United States
The legal definition of stalking varies among jurisdictions.38  In
some states, there must be an element of victim fear and emotional
distress;39 other states require a specific intent of the stalker.40  More-
over, some state laws specify that the victim must have been fright-
ened by the stalking,41 but other states only require that the stalking
would have caused a reasonable person to experience fear.42  Al-
though Cyberstalking legislation has increased throughout the years, it
is clear that each state has its own inconsistent idea of how to combat
the problem.
B. Stalking Legislation in Illinois
Illinois’ stalking legislation has proven to be one of the strictest
stalking statutes developed in the nation.43  In Illinois, stalking occurs
34. See “Friending” an Old Flame on Social Media, FOCUS FAMILY (Sept. 30, 2016, 4:25 PM),
http://family.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/26281/~/
%E2%80%9Cfriending%E2%80%9D-an-old-flame-on-social-media.
35. Amber Ferguson, Md. Man Convicted of Cyberstalking His Ex-Wife, NBC4 WASH. (June
13, 2013, 6:26 PM), http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Md-Man-Convicted-of-73-
Counts-of-Cyberstalking-Stalking-Ex-Wife-211445501.html (“The jury convicted Johnson after
deliberating for three hours.  He was found guilty of one count of stalking, 10 counts of reckless
endangerment, two counts of harassment, seven counts of harassment by electronic mail and 53
counts of violation of a protective order.”).
36. Id. (“Johnson also set up fake online profiles, claiming to be her, on Facebook, Craigslist,
Blackplanet and other Internet sites, asking men to come to her house for sex and, in one post-
ing, telling men to come to her house and rape her.”).
37. Id.
38. SHANNAN M. CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES–REVISED 3 (2012), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1211.
39. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2008); FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (2016); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (2016).
40. See generally CATALANO, supra note 38. R
41. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-3133 (2016).
42. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 16-5-90 (2013).
43. Brenda K. Harmon, Comment, Illinois’ Newly Amended Stalking Law: Are All the
Problems Solved?, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 165, 165 (1994).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-3\DPL302.txt unknown Seq: 6 13-SEP-17 13:03
906 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:901
when a person knowingly engages in conduct that is directed at a spe-
cific target and “knows (or should know) that these actions would
cause a reasonable person to fear for his/her safety, fear for the safety
of another person, or suffer emotional distress.”44  There are two ele-
ments to stalking: (1) “following or placing [the victim] under surveil-
lance and (2) at any time threatening [the victim] with or placing [her]
in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm, sexual assault, confine-
ment, or restraint.”45  Both of these elements must be met to bring a
stalking charge against the alleged abuser.46  Stalking behavior could
include following, monitoring, observing, conducting surveillance, or
threatening the victim.47  A relatively new crime that has been broadly
defined is Cyberstalking.48  Because the internet is somewhat low cost,
easy to use, and anonymous in nature, it sets itself up to be an “attrac-
tive medium” for scams, child exploitation, and online stalking.49  In
addition, because it is new, many states have struggled to adequately
implement cyberstalking statutes.50
C. Cyberstalking
With advancements in technology, stalkers are finding new ways to
gather information about their victims through the use of the In-
44. Stalking No Contact Orders, WOMENSLAW.ORG, http://www.womenslaw.org/
laws_state_type.php?id=15432&state_code=IL (last updated Apr. 13, 2017).
45. The Domestic Violence Division–Stalking, COOK COUNTY ST.’S ATT’Y’S OFF., http://gtzinc
.com/dvstalking.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2017).
46. Id.
47. Stalking No Contact Orders, supra note 44.  Other examples of contact could include any R
of the following actions that a person directs towards you:
being in your physical presence; appearing within your sight; approaching or con-
fronting you in a public place or on private property; appearing at your workplace or
home; entering onto or remaining on property that you own or lease or are currently
occupying; placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or
occupied by you.
Id.
48. Online Harassment & Cyberstalking, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://www.privacyrights.org/are-you-being-stalked#3.
As technology evolves, so does the practice of cyberstalking. A web–savvy stalker can
wreak havoc on the life of a victim, both online and offline. This can be incredibly
damaging, particularly as more people use the Internet to pay bills, make friends, date,
work, share ideas and find jobs.
Id.
49. U.S. ATT’Y GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND INDUSTRY (1999), http://www.cyber-rights.org/documents/cyberstalkingre-
port.htm.
50. See Online Harassment & Cyberstalking, supra note 48. (“All states have anti-stalking R
laws, but the legal definitions vary.  Some state laws require that the perpetrator, to qualify as a
stalker, make a credible threat of violence against the victim. Others require only that the
stalker’s conduct constitute an implied threat.”).
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ternet.51  Legislation addressing the issue of cyberstalking must be
adaptive and constantly updated to ensure that victims are pro-
tected.52  Cyberstalking is hard to legally address because the stalker
could be “in another state or sitting three cubicles away from the vic-
tim.”53  Victims and law enforcement agencies may have trouble con-
firming the stalker’s identity because the Internet provides a great
degree of anonymity.54  Relatively few federal statutes address cyber-
stalking.55  The federal government appears to have left it up to the
individual states to determine what constitutes cyberstalking.56  In
turn, nearly every state has enacted legislation that targets
cyberstalking.57
It is very easy for abusers to stalk their victims online.58  Many
cyberstalkers use online forums and social networking sites such as
Twitter, Facebook, and Myspace.59  Cyberstalkers tend to conduct
personal research on individuals by requesting their victims as friends
on social media sites while disguising their true identity with that of
someone else.60  Many cyberstalkers then post defamatory statements
about their victim on the internet to get a reaction from the victim,
and thus initiate contact.61
51. Id.
52. Ashley N. B. Beagle, Comment, Modern Stalking Laws: A Survey of State Anti-Stalking
Statutes Considering Modern Mediums and Constitutional Challenges, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 457, 471
(2011).
53. See Online Harassment & Cyberstalking, supra note 48. R
54. Id. (“In the anonymous world of the Internet, it is difficult to verify a stalker’s identity,
collect the necessary evidence for an arrest and then trace the cyberstalker to a physical
location.”).
55. See Federal Stalking Laws, STALKING RESOURCE CTR., https://www.victimsofcrime.org/
our-programs/stalking-resource-center/stalking-laws/federal-stalking-laws (last visited Jan. 4,
2017).
56. Id.
57. Steven D. Hazelwood & Sarah Koon-Magnin, Cyber Stalking and Cyber Harassment Leg-
islation in the United States: A Qualitative Analysis, 7 INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 155, 160–61
(2013).
58. Dan Tynan, Online Stalking Made Easy, PCWORLD.COM (Jan. 26, 2009, 2:15 PM), http://
www.pcworld.com/article/158347/online_stalking_spokeo.html (“In other words, for just $3 to $5
a month Spokeo gives you the ability to stalk near-total strangers in new and fascinating ways.”).
59. See McVeigh, supra note 25. R
It started with a notice on an online bulletin board he knew Joanne would see: her
name, her husband’s name, their address, email and telephone number.  Then, to show
he was watching, small details about her family would appear—updates her children
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Cyberstalkers vary in age.62  In 2011, a twelve-year-old girl from
Washington was convicted of cyberstalking and computer trespass in
the first degree.63  On March 18, 2011, the girl hacked her former
friends Facebook page.64  She posted threatening images targeting the
victim.65  The girl then sent out messages to the victim’s Facebook
friends asking for sexual favors.66  Another example occurred in 2013
when a family was sentenced to life in prison for the first federal
cyberstalking conviction in the United States.67  The defendants in-
cluded a mother, brother, and sister.68  The family used mail, email,
websites and internet postings to disseminate false allegations that the
brother’s ex-wife had abused her children and suffered from mental
illness.69  On February 11, 2013, the father murdered his ex-daughter-
in-law in a courthouse, before killing himself.70  The prosecutor in the
case argued that the murder was “reasonably foreseeable” to the fam-
ilies’ cyberstalking.71  A federal jury convicted the mother, brother,
and sister of interstate stalking and cyberstalking, and found each in-
dividual criminally responsible for the ex-wife’s death.72
D. Cyberstalking in Illinois
Illinois has taken numerous steps to ensure that victims of cyber-
stalking are protected.73  In 2001, the Illinois General Assembly en-
acted the Cyberstalking Statute that dealt specifically with electronic
communication.74  In January 2010, the Illinois General Assembly en-
62. Laura Riparbelli, 12-Year-Old Sentenced for Cyberstalking Classmate, ABC NEWS (July
14, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/12-year-sentenced-washington-cyberstalking-case/
story?id=14072315.
63. Id. (“The 12-year-old . . . was sentenced to six months of probation and 20 hours of com-




67. Lauren Walker, Family Receives Life in Prison for First-Ever Cyberstalking Conviction,







73. Cyberstalking, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.5 (2014), invalidated in part by Illinois v.
Relerford, 56 N.E.3d 489 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (holding that subsections (a)(1)–(2) were facially
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they
lacked a mens rea requirement).
74. P.A. 92-199, 2001 Ill. Laws 1773 (codified as amended at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.5
(2014)).
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acted the Stalking No Contact Order Act (No Contact Act).75  The No
Contact Act gave victims who have not had a dating or intimate rela-
tionship with their stalker an opportunity to have their concerns ad-
dressed in a court proceeding.76  In Illinois, if an individual feels that
she is being stalked, she can file for a Stalking No Contact Order.77
“A petition for a stalking no contact order can be filed in the county
where [the victim] live[s], where the stalker lives, or where one or
more acts of stalking took place.”78  In order to obtain a Stalking No
Contact Order, the victim must show a pattern of stalking behavior on
behalf of the respondent.79  This pattern of behavior, or course of con-
duct, must consist of at least two acts of stalking behavior.80  The con-
duct can be direct or indirect.81  The Stalking No Contact Order is a
civil remedy.82  Therefore, once a respondent violates the order, there
is a hearing in a civil courtroom.83
E. Violating the Stalking No Contact Order
In Illinois, a violation of any civil Stalking No Contact Order,
whether issued in a civil or criminal proceeding, has the potential to
become a criminal charge.84  Criminal orders of protection and  civil
orders are inherently different.85  Criminal orders are issued simulta-
neously upon domestic violence arrests.86  On the other hand, to ob-
tain a civil order, the victim must appear before either civil or family
court to petition that court for a protection order.87  Another impor-
tant difference is how the respondent is served with the order.88  In a
criminal case, the respondent is usually served at the arraignment,
while in front of the judge.89  For a civil order, the victim is responsi-
75. P.A. 96-246, 2009 Ill. Laws 3237 (codified as amended at 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 21/1 to /135
(2014)).
76. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 21/1 to /135.  Cyberstalking is not specifically addressed in this
statute. See id.
77. Id. §§ 15, 20.
78. See Stalking No Contact Orders, supra note 44. R
79. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 21/10.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. § 30.
83. Id.
84. Id. § 10.
85. See What Happens When Someone Violates a Court Order?, DOMESTICSHELTERS.ORG
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ble for sending notice to the respondent and a preliminary hearing
occurs before a judge to decide if the order should be put in place.90
The No Contact Act lists various definitions of “contact” that are
prohibited.91  “Contact” under the Not Contact Act includes, “any
contact with the victim, that is initiated or continued without the vic-
tim’s consent, or that is in disregard of the victim’s expressed desire
that the contact be avoided or discontinued.”92  If the respondent has
“contacted” the victim more than once he has opened himself up to a
possible order being issued against him.93
F. Courts’ Interpretation of Contact
Courts across the country have interpreted the word “contact” very
broadly.  Some courts have interpreted “contact” to include posting
messages on a personal Facebook page that in some way, shape, or
form, addresses the victim.94  For example, in New Hampshire v.
Craig,95 the New Hampshire Supreme Court interpreted “contact” to
include posting messages on social media.96  The court found that
posting on a social media site constituted contacting the victim and
therefore was a violation of the restraining order.97  Notably, the vic-
tim in this case was not a “friend” of the defendant on Facebook.98
Rather, the victim’s mother informed the victim of what was on the
defendant’s Facebook page and the victim subsequently went to
search for the post.99  Nevertheless, the court ultimately concluded
90. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 21/60 (2014).
91. Id. § 10.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Craig, 112 A.3d 559, 565 (N.H. 2015).
95. Id. at 559.
96. Id. at 566.
By posting messages addressing the victim on his public Facebook page, and directing
the victim’s attention to his page, the defendant both created a message and took steps
to convey it to the victim.  To construe the statute as not encompassing the defendant’s
conduct—writing a message addressing the victim and posting it in a public forum, but
not personally conveying the message to the victim—would add limiting language that
the legislature did not include.
Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 563.
Although the victim had a Facebook page at the time, she was not a “Facebook friend”
of the defendant. However, because the defendant’s page was public, the victim found
the defendant’s Facebook page simply by entering his name into the Facebook search
tool.  The defendant’s posts were contained in his Facebook “Notes,” which the victim
could read by opening the “Notes” section of the defendant’s Facebook profile page.
Id.
99. Id.
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that the defendant’s personal Facebook page constituted a public
forum.100
In Craig, the defendant was convicted of criminal threatening, wit-
ness tampering, and stalking.101  The convictions were based on
messages that he posted on his Facebook profile page directed to the
victim.102  The defendant followed the victim to her workplace, where
“their relationship consisted only of ‘very casual, very simple’ cus-
tomer-server communications.”103  The defendant then started send-
ing the victim letters addressed to her work.104  The victim received a
restraining order against the defendant.105  “The restraining order re-
quired the ‘[s]toppage of the mail letters and no contact whatsoever,
phone, email, et cetera.’”106  After being served the order, the defen-
dant continued to post about the victim on his page.107  Part of the
post stated, “HA HA. I mentioned Facebook in a letter, you men-
tioned your knowledge of it in your complaint, yet did not say not to
talk about you on here.”108  The victim accessed the defendant’s
Facebook page and saw the post.109  “Although the victim had a
Facebook page at the time, she was not a ‘Facebook friend’ of the
defendant.”110
After being convicted of stalking the victim, the defendant appealed
his case.111  On appeal, he argued that “there was insufficient evidence
that he stalked the victim because he did not take an ‘action to com-
municate’ with the victim as required by the definition of ‘contact’” in
the relevant stalking statute.112  The defendant contended that in or-
der for his conduct to constitute “contact” pursuant to the stalking
statute, he must have been “the actor not only in the creation of the
message, but in the conveyance of it to the protected person.”113  The
defendant further argued that his Facebook posts could not constitute
contact because he did not send the posts directly to the victim.114
100. Craig, 112 A.3d at 566.
101. Id. at 560, 563.




106. Craig, 112 A.3d at 561.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 562.
109. Id. at 563.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Craig, 112 A.3d at 565.
113. Id. at 566.
114. Id. (“[H]e merely posted publicly online without sending the posts directly to the victim,
and, therefore, did not take an ‘action to communicate’ as required by [the statute].”).
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The court ultimately held that the defendant’s post did constitute con-
tact.115  The court reasoned that the statute only requires that a person
act “either directly or indirectly” to “communicate with another.”116
The court further explained that the stalking statute was meant to be
construed liberally and that the purpose of the statute was to “pre-
serve and protect the safety of the family unit for all family or house-
hold members by entitling victims of domestic violence to immediate
and effective police protection and judicial relief.”117
Another case considering contact via Facebook is O’Leary v. Flor-
ida.118  In O’Leary, the defendant filed an appeal for the denial of his
motion to dismiss two counts of sending written threats to kill or do
bodily harm in violation of a Florida statute.119  The defendant posted
a statement on his personal Facebook page which “threatened death
or serious bodily injury” to his relative.120  The defendant’s cousin,
who was not the target of the statement, was friends with the defen-
dant on Facebook and therefore able to view the statement.121  The
parties did not dispute that the defendant never expressly asked his
cousin to view the Facebook page or the threatening post.122  Never-
theless, the cousin viewed the post.123  The cousin then showed the
threatening post to his uncle, and the uncle told the victim about the
defendant’s post.124
The defendant argued that, by posting his message on his personal
Facebook page, he “at most, published the message, which is not a
violation of the statute.”125  He further argued that he “sent” nothing
because he never asked anyone to look at the page.126  The court in
O’Leary relied on Florida v. Wise,127 which dealt with a defendant
that was sending threatening letters to a victim while he was in jail.128
The court in Wise created a two-part test to determine what consti-
tutes “sending” a message for the purposes of the Florida threatening
115. Id. at 569.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 567.
118. 109 So. 3d 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
119. Id. at 875–86.




124. O’Leary, 109 So. 3d at 875.
125. Id. at 877.
126. Id.
127. 664 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
128. Id. at 1029.
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statute.129 Wise defined “sending” as “the depositing of the communi-
cation in the mail or through some other form of delivery” and “re-
ceipt of the communication by the person being threatened.”130  The
court held that receipt of a threatening communication by a family
member of the person threatened would also fulfill the second prong
of Wise’s two-part definition of “sending.”131
After analyzing the precedent from Wise, the court in O’Leary con-
cluded that “[w]hen a person composes a statement of thought, and
then displays the composition in such a way that someone else can see
it, that person has completed the first step in the Wise court’s defini-
tion of ‘sending.’”132  The court found that the defendant “reduced his
thoughts to writing” and “placed this written composition onto his
personal Facebook page.”133  The court reasoned that the posting was
available for viewing to all of the defendant’s Facebook “friends.”134
The court looked at Facebook’s mission and found that “there is no
logical reason to post comments other than to communicate them to
other Facebook users.”135  By completing the “affirmative act of post-
ing the threats on Facebook,” even though it was on his own personal
page, the court held that the defendant sent the post to all of his
Facebook friends, including his cousin.136
The Statute includes the word “threatens” under “course of con-
duct.”137  In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Elonis v. United
129. Id. at 1030.  Section 836.10 is violated when: “(1) a person writes or composes a threat to
kill or do bodily injury; (2) the person sends or procures the sending of that communication to
another person; and (3) the threat is to the recipient of the communication or a member of his
family.” Id.
130. Id.
131. O’Leary, 109 So. 3d at 876.
132. Id. at 877.  The court in O’Leary described the “sending” process as follows:
When the threatened individual, or a family member of the threatened individual,
views and receives the thoughts made available by the composer, the second step in the
Wise definition is completed. At that point, the statement is “sent” for purposes of
section 836.10. Further, Internet technologies “generally do not involve communica-
tions sent directly to another. Rather, communications are posted for the whole world
to see, or, in a closed network for a particular community to see, such as a community
of ‘Facebook friends.’”
Id. (quoting Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1103, 1127–28 (2011) (footnote omitted)).
133. Id.
134. Id. (explaining that the defendant requested his cousin to be his Facebook friend, a re-
quest that the cousin accepted, and that by posting threats directed to his relative on his
Facebook page, the court stated that it was reasonable to presume that the defendant wished to
communicate that information to all of his Facebook friends).
135. Id.
136. Id. (“[The cousin] received the composition by viewing it.”).
137. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 21/10 (2014).
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States138 and held that the defendant should be criminally charged for
posting something “threatening” on his Facebook page.139  The case
centered on the mental state required for a threat to be considered
criminal.140
In Elonis, the defendant, Anthony Elonis, posted threatening
messages on social media after his wife left him and took their chil-
dren with her.  One Facebook post read: “‘There’s one way to love ya
but a thousand ways to kill ya.  I’m not gonna rest until your body is a
mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts.’”141  The de-
fendant’s wife obtained an order of protection after receiving several
other threats from him.142  The defendant was “convicted of a federal
offense and sentenced to more than three years in prison.”143  He then
appealed his conviction.144
On June 1, 2015, the Court reversed Elonis’ conviction.145  The
Court held that the prosecution needed to show that Elonis actually
intended for the posts to be threats.146  The Court reasoned that an
objective reasonable person standard would not go far enough to sep-
arate wrongful conduct from innocent conduct.147  The Court held
that, in this case, an objective standard would risk punishing an inno-
cent actor because the critical element that makes this behavior crimi-
nal is the threat, not merely the posting.148
G. The Unconstitutional Illinois Cyberstalking Statute
Recently, an Illinois appellate court held that contacting the victim
is not enough to violate the Statute.  Rather, there needs to be a mens
rea requirement incorporated in the Statute that puts the defendant
on notice.  In June 2016, the Illinois First Circuit Court of Appeals
declared portions of the Illinois Cyberstalking Statute to be unconsti-
138. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
139. Id. at 2004, 2011.
140. Id.






145. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2013.
146. Id. at 2010.
147. Id. at 2011 (“The crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct is the
threatening nature of the communication . . . .” (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994))).
148. Id. at 2011–12 (“[W]e ‘have long been reluctant to infer that a negligence standard was
intended in criminal statutes.’” (quoting Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring))).
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tutional.149  In Relerford, the defendant was convicted of stalking and
cyberstalking his former co-worker.  The appellate court vacated his
convictions, finding that two sections of the Statute were facially un-
constitutional because they lacked a mens rea requirement.150  Be-
cause sections (a)(1) and (2) of the general stalking statute and
sections (a)(1) and (2) of the Statute contained only a reasonable per-
son standard and no requirement that defendant actually intend to
inflict emotional suffering on a person, the court found that they were
facially unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.151
The Illinois General Assembly needs to ensure that all forms of
stalking are covered under the Statute.  By implementing a social me-
dia component into the law, the legislature will not only be better able
to protect victims of cyberstalking, but will also put social media users
on notice of the possible repercussions for posting, searching, or using
those sites to stalk others.
III. ANALYSIS
To ensure that stalking is handled appropriately, the Illinois Gen-
eral Assembly must ensure that the stalking statutes are relevant and
updated.  It is important for the General Assembly to research and
analyze current stalking statistics across the nation.  Moreover, it is
important for the General Assembly to understand the role that social
media plays in stalking.  The Internet has opened up a new domain to
stalkers, and it therefore needs to be policed just as heavily as tradi-
tional, in-person stalking.152  New websites are created every day that
make it easier for stalkers to find victims and control them.153  It is
now extremely easy for predators to monitor their victims through de-
149. Illinois v. Relerford, 56 N.E.3d 489, 491 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the cyberstalking statute are virtually identical to sub-
sections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the general stalking statute.  The principal difference is
that the cyberstalking statute specifies that the defendant’s course of conduct involved
electronic communications. It necessarily follows then, that subsections (a)(1) and
(a)(2) of the cyberstalking statute, which also lack a mens rea requirement, are facially
unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment for the




151. Id. at 495–97.
152. See Cassie Cox, Protecting Victims of Cyberstalking, Cyberharassment, and Online Imper-
sonation Through Prosecutions and Effective Laws, 54 JURIMETRICS J. 277, 285 (2014).
153. Angela Moscaritolo, Facebook Update Makes It Easier to Stalk Your Friends, PCMAG
(July 9, 2015, 10:28 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2487400,00.asp (“Now it’s even
easier to ensure you never miss a Facebook post from your best friend—or frenemy.”).
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velopments in a wide range of technology, including global positioning
system (GPS) devices.154  In order to ensure that the Statute effec-
tively deters cyberstalking, the Illinois General Assembly needs to im-
plement a clear and concise social media component.
The Illinois General Assembly essentially has two choices in terms
of amending the Statute; it can impose a strict social media compo-
nent into the law, which include a mens rea requirement, or explicitly
restrict certain avenues of social media from the Statute.  By institut-
ing a strict social media component into the Statute, constitutional vio-
lations are likely to occur.155  This Comment proposes a balance
between instituting a clear social media component into the Statute
and protecting the due process and First Amendment freedom of
speech rights of defendants.  The General Assembly can add a section
to the Statute that specifically addresses social media.  This section
would put the defendant on notice that intentional contact via social
media would constitute a violation of the Statute.  The contact must
be initiated by the defendant in an effort to convey the message to the
victim.156  The mens rea requirement is essential to ensuring that the
Statute is carried out properly.
This Part analyzes the role that social media plays in relation to
stalking, and posits that the Illinois General Assembly needs to up-
date the Statute to include social media and implement a new and
separate component to the Statute specifically addressing the requisite
mens rea.
A. Social Media’s Role in Stalking
Social media has become increasingly relevant in this technologi-
cally advanced world.157  One form of social media, Facebook, has be-
come a major avenue for stalkers to stalk their victims.158  Facebook is
a social media website whose mission is “to give people the power to
share and make the world more open and connected.”159  However,
social media websites, like Facebook, have made it harder to police
154. Leah Yamshon, GPS: A Stalker’s Best Friend, PC WORLD (Feb. 11, 2010, 6:00 PM) http://
www.pcworld.com/article/188274/gps_a_stalkers_best_friend.html.
155. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2008 (2015).
156. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.5 (2014).
157. Jessica Bosari, The Developing Role of Social Media in the Modern Business World,
FORBES (Aug. 8, 2012, 12:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/moneywisewomen/2012/08/08/the-
developing-role-of-social-media-in-the-modern-business-world/#30a9f7f54189.
158. See Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1168. R
159. Mission Statement, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Mar.
1, 2017).
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stalking and cyberstalking issues.160  Because so many people have ac-
cess to Facebook, it has created endless opportunities for stalking to
take place161 because not all users engage in proper Facebook eti-
quette.162  Consider the hypothetical situation in which a user sends
friend requests to people they have never met, tries to engage in con-
versation, and then becomes upset when the stranger does not re-
spond.  This scenario begs the question: When does “Facebook
stalking” become criminal?163
“Facebook stalking” has become an idiom for visiting other users’
Facebook profiles to “browse through their photos, posts, and interac-
tions.”164  Facebook has made it easier to stalk people by allowing
users to have public profiles.165  Facebook does not have any “pri-
vacy” features that can hide the profile picture.166  Thus, unless the
user wants to put a picture of something other than their personal
image, or simply a blank image, the entire world has access to the
profile picture.167  Allowing access to this profile picture can give
160. J. A. Hitchcock, Cyberstalking and Law Enforcement: Keeping Up with the Web, COM-
PUTER ME (2000), http://computeme.tripod.com/cyberstalk.html.
161. Joe McGauley, All the Creepy Ways People Are Stalking You Online, THRILLIST (June 3,
2016), https://www.thrillist.com/tech/nation/cyberstalking-people-with-facebook-instagram-
linkedin-and-tinder.
162. See, e.g., Michael Poh, Essential Facebook Etiquette: 10 Dos and Dont’s, HONGKIAT,
http://www.hongkiat.com/blog/facebook-etiquette/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2017).
163. The Nature of Facebook Stalking, NOBULLYING.COM (Dec. 22, 2015), http://nobullying
.com/facebook-stalking/.
164. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shifting
Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 100 (2013).  The authors, however, make an interesting
observation:
“Facebook stalking, more generally, is simply using Facebook.”  Indeed, who has not
rummaged through the photos of an ex-girlfriend or current colleague?  Yet the conno-
tation associated with Facebook stalking is clearly negative (e.g., it is not called
“Facebook courtesy visiting”); and it is no coincidence that unlike LinkedIn, its busi-
ness-focused competitor, Facebook keeps information about who visited your profile a
closely guarded secret.  On LinkedIn, expanded capability to see who has viewed your
profile is a premium feature, since social norms for business networking seem to sup-
port this type of browsing.  The rules of engagement on “stalking” or visiting other
profiles have yet to be written.  And this further muddles the boundary between ethical
and unsavory social media behavior.
Id.; see also Tara C. Marshall, Facebook Surveillance of Former Romantic Partners: Associations
with PostBreakup Recovery and Personal Growth, 10 CYBERPSYCHOL., BEHAV. & SOC.
NETWORKING 521, 521 (2012) (“Many of the features that make Facebook attractive to its
users—easy, free, and anonymous access to information about others—can also facilitate online
monitoring behavior.  Excessively checking others’ Facebook profiles has been variously re-
ferred to as interpersonal electronic surveillance, Facebook surveillance, or, more colloquially, as
‘Facebook stalking.’”).
165. Who Can See My Profile Picture and Cover Photo?, Facebook, https://www.facebook
.com/help/193629617349922 (last visited Jan. 11, 2017).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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stalkers further access to personal images.168  Moreover, unlike
LinkedIn,169 Facebook hides profile views from its users.170  So, a
stalker could look at his victim’s Facebook page one hundred times
per day, and the victim would never know.171  In its effort to make the
world more “open and connected,” Facebook may by its design,
though unintended, facilitate stalking.172
Because Facebook has become so commonplace, it might be hard
for victims of stalking to deactivate their pages.173  Further, making a
victim deactivate her Facebook page seems more like a punishment
rather than a safety protection.  There is a double standard for victims
of cyberstalking.  For example, victims of phone harassment are not
required to get rid of their phones after being harassed, therefore, why
should cyberstalking victims be required to do without their personal
social media page?  By instituting a strong social media component
into the law, society will not have to worry about jeopardizing the
victim’s freedoms for safety.  A clear and concise social media compo-
nent will provide further protection for victims from being contacted
by their cyberstalkers on social media.  The victim may be comforted
in the fact that if the cyberstalker violates the Statute, he can be held
responsible in a court of law.
There is a common misconception that social media posts marked
“private” are in fact private.174  Facebook allows users to make posts
“private” by clicking a button, known as the “privacy check” button,
that limits who can view the users’ posts.175  By clicking “Sign Up,”
168. Id.
169. See Facebook vs. LinkedIn—What’s the Difference?, FORBES (May 21, 2012), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/joshbersin/2012/05/21/facebook-vs-linkedin-whats-the-difference/#4482217e79
2f.  LinkedIn now allows users to opt out of the viewing preferences under the “Select what
others see when you’ve viewed their profile” setting.  Kirsten Hodgson, How to View Other
People’s LinkedIn Profiles Anonymously, LINKEDIN (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/
pulse/20141009022529-27827108-how-to-view-other-people-s-profiles-anonymously.
170. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 164, at 100. R
171. Id.
172. About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg/facebook/about/ (last visited Apr. 4,
2017).
173. Id.; see also Maria Aspan, On Facebook, Leaving Is Hard to Do, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/11/business/worldbusiness/11iht-11facebook.9919316
.html.
174. Ozer, supra note 3. R
175. Id.; see also Stokes, supra note 5; see also Michael Osakwe, Facebook’s Privacy Checkup: R
What Is It and Why Is It Important?, NEXTADVISOR (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.nextadvisor.com/
blog/2016/03/02/facebook-privacy-checkup/.  “The Privacy Checkup helps you review who can
see your posts and info from your profile, like your phone number and email address.  It also
shows you settings for apps you’ve logged into with Facebook.” What’s the Privacy Checkup and
How Can I Find It?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/443357099140264 (last visited
Jan. 13, 2017).
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however, Facebook warns users that they are essentially entering into
a contract accepting Facebook’s terms and admitting having read the
Data Use Policy.  Facebook’s terms and conditions section informs
users that Facebook may use all of the information they receive about
the user to serve ads that are more relevant to the user, which includes
information provided at registration or added to the users account or
timeline.176  Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University determined
that it would take the average American seventy-six working days to
read all the privacy policies they agreed to each year.177  It would be
unreasonable to expect the average user to read through and under-
stand the entire terms and condition’s section, especially if it would
take them over two months to finish.
Because courts have not said that a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy regarding social media exists, it is even more important that the
Illinois General Assembly makes a change to the Statute.178  Defend-
ants must be aware that any contact, whether direct or indirect, may
constitute contact for purposes of the Statute.179  Victims also need
greater protection from any threats that may be communicated to
them through social media.  By implementing a clear and concise so-
cial media component into the Statute, the General Assembly will en-
sure that defendants are put on notice that “private” social media
outlets will still subject them to a violation.
B. Social Media Promotes Stalking
Social media websites, like Facebook, encourage stalking.180
“Facebook creeping181” has become “normal” for users because the
site keeps each users search history private.182  Recently, Facebook
176. Amanda Scherker, Didn’t Read Facebook’s Fine Print? Here’s Exactly What It Says, HUF-
FINGTON POST (July 21, 2014, 7:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/21/facebook-
terms-condition_n_5551965.html.
177. See id.
178. Mark Sableman, Do You Have Privacy Rights on Social Media?, THOMPSON COBURN
(July 12, 2016), http://www.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/blogs/internet-law-twists-turns/post/
2016-07-12/do-you-have-privacy-rights-on-social-media-.
179. See Cox, supra note 152. R
180. Alexandra Topping, Social Networking Sites Fueling Stalking, Report Warns, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 1, 2012, 2:00 PM) https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/feb/01/social-media-
smartphones-stalking.
181. What Does ‘Creeping’ Mean?, LIFEWIRE (Aug. 16, 2016) https://www.lifewire.com/what-
does-creeping-mean-2655280.
182. Drake Bennett, Facebook Succeeds Because Deep Down, We’re All Stalkers, BLOOM-
BERG (May 23, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-05-23/the-secret-of-face
books-success-it-made-stalking-easy (“Facebook leaves users free to peruse others’ content in
secret . . . . 80 percent of the clicks on Facebook are related to viewing others’ content, while only
8 percent to 9 percent are related to posting one’s own.”).
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has launched an update that allows users to prioritize who they want
to see first on their news feeds.183  This feature enables users to hand
pick who they want to “view” on their newsfeed.184  Not only is this
tool helpful for stalkers, but the feature also does not notify those
users that someone has added them to their priority list.185  Therefore,
by allowing users to anonymously creep through fellow Facebook
users’ profiles, Facebook is passively promoting cyberstalking.186
Facebook stalking has also become increasingly relevant as a coping
method following relationship break-ups.187  After a break-up, an in-
dividual can constantly view their ex-partner’s Facebook page hun-
dreds of times a day, essentially monitoring their every move.188  This
anonymous access to an ex-partner’s Facebook profile may lead to ob-
sessive tendencies that eventually turns into stalking.
Facebook stalking can have a huge impact on relationship intrusion,
it is important for the Illinois legislature to incorporate a social media
component into the Statute.189  Research has shown that Facebook
stalking is becoming more prevalent and consistently leads to danger-
ous outcomes for the victims.190  If the General Assembly were to ad-
dress the ramifications of cyberstalking, it might create a deterrence
effect on Facebook stalking.
183. Megan Friedman, A New Feature Just Made Facebook Stalking Easier Than Ever, COS-




186. See Topping, supra note 180. R
187. Tia Ghose, 10 Tips for Healthy Facebook Breakups, LIVE SCI. (Aug. 21, 2014, 7:55 AM),
http://www.livescience.com/47480-tips-for-healthy-facebook-breakups.html.
188. Marlynn Wei, How to Keep Social Media from Complicating Your Relationship,
PSYCHCOL. TODAY (Jan. 25, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/urban-survival/2015
01/how-keep-social-media-complicating-your-relationship.  Researchers have identified aspects
of social media sites that “make them more prone to relationship surveillance”:
1. Information is easily accessible.  Even if a profile isn’t public, it’s likely that it’s
shared with a person’s partner or available via mutual friends.
2. People post a wide variety of media, ranging from photos and videos to links.
Photos can communicate a lot of information about location, behaviors, and social
interactions.
3. Social media profiles archive a significant amount of past information.  How often
do people delete old photos from their Instagram feed from two or three years ago?
Probably not that often.  Editing posts is tedious, and people would lose their posting
history, making it even less likely that they will want to remove old data.
4. Data can be gathered secretly.  Most social networking sites do not give you reports
on who is looking at your information or how often.
Id.
189. See Ghose, supra note 187. R
190. Facebook Stalking and Addiction, TEEN REHAB (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.teendrug
rehabs.com/blog/facebook-stalking-addiction/.
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Implementing a social media component into the Statute will ensure
that victims of stalking have protection from any and all types of un-
wanted contact, including through electronic platforms such as social
media.191  Because victims are often denied justice in cyberstalking
cases, it is not surprising that they have little confidence in the legal
system.192  In the face of waning confidence, the Illinois General As-
sembly must ensure that these victims are protected in all foreseeable
situations.
If the Statute is not amended to have a clear and all-encompassing
social media component, the public will not know what constitutes a
violation under the Statute.  Technology is ever changing and so are
social media websites.193  It is hard enough for users to keep up with
the constant application updates, let alone the underlying meaning of
the terms and conditions sections.194  Therefore, unless the Statute is
clear and all encompassing, defendants will likely be in the dark in
relation to social media violations.
C. Indirect Stalking
What most stalkers fail to realize is that stalking does not have to be
direct contact.195  Stalking incudes posting on social media, posting on
personal accounts, and posting information concerning the victim,
which the victim may not have access to or cannot view.196  Although
no case law on stalking order violations exists in Illinois, the broad
consensus among different jurisdictions is that almost any type of con-
tact, direct or indirect, will constitute a violation of the relevant stalk-
191. Examples of Stalking Behavior to Watch Out For, NO BULLYING (Nov. 5, 2014), https://
nobullying.com/examples-of-stalking-behavior-to-watch-out-for/.
192. Katharine Quarmby, How the Law Is Standing Up to Cyberstalking, NEWSWEEK (Aug.
13, 2014, 6:08 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/08/22/how-law-standing-cyberstalking-2642
51.html.
193. Scott May, Technology Always Changing, COLUM. TRIB. (Jan. 31, 2013, 9:51 AM), http://
www.columbiatribune.com/business/pc_info/technology-always-changing/article_05bc9df2-a007-
591e-a9e7-f2be78e1404f.html.
194. Oliver Smith, Facebook Terms and Conditions: Why You Don’t Own Your Online Life,
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/social-media/9780565/Face
book-terms-and-conditions-why-you-dont-own-your-online-life.html.
195. Stalking Safety Planning, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME (2009), https://www.victim-
sofcrime.org/our-programs/stalking-resource-center/help-for-victims/stalking-safety-planning.
“Stalkers’ behaviors can escalate, from more indirect ways of making contact (e.g. sending email
or repeated phone calling) to more personal ways (delivering things to the victim’s doorstep or
showing up at their work).” Id.
196. Id.
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ing legislation.197  As in Craig, even though the defendant did not
communicate directly with the victim, he was still held in violation of
the order.198
In Craig, the New Hampshire Supreme Court interpreted “con-
tact,” in the stalking context, to include posting messages on social
media.199  A broad interpretation of the Statute would entitle victims
protection from stalking throughout all forms of communication.200
However, in order for the Statute to be effective, it must be clear.  As
currently written, the Illinois Cyberstalking Statute is ambiguous as to
what types of social communication are considered “contact.”201  The
point behind having a broad statute is to ensure that victims are pro-
tected.  A broad statute would also ensure that there are not any loop-
holes for defendants to get access to the victim.202  However, the
Illinois General Assembly cannot create broad statutes that impinge
on the constitutional rights of American citizens.  Defendants must be
aware of what type of actions are considered “contact.”
The New Hampshire statute in Craig specifically lists “any form of
electronic communication” in its list of “actions to communicate.”203
The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that this mention of elec-
tronic communication “reflected the legislature’s awareness of techno-
logical advances in communication.”204  The court explained that
when a person “composes a statement of thought, and then displays
the composition in such a way that someone else can see it” that per-
son has completed the first step in sending the message through social
media.205  Furthermore, by posting the message on a social media out-
let, the court ruled that there was “‘no logical reason’ for the defen-
dant to post statements directed to the victim on Facebook other than
to communicate them.”206  Therefore, the court ultimately held that
personal posts on a social media outlet constitute “contact” for the
197. Terry O’Malley, Social Media Sites Can Cause Protection/Restraining Order Violation in
Larimer County, O’MALLEY LAW OFFICE P.C. (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.criminaldefensefort
collins.com/social-media-restraining-order-violation/.
198. New Hampshire v. Craig, 112 A.3d 559, 566 (N.H. 2015).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.5 (2014).
202. John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “Non-
Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 1081, 1128 (2011).
203. N.H. REV. STAT. § 173-B:1 (2016).  “‘Contact’ means any action to communicate with
another either directly or indirectly, including, but not limited to, using any form of electronic
communication, leaving items, or causing another to communicate in such fashion.” Id.
204. Craig, 112 A.3d at 566.
205. Id. at 567.
206. Id.at 568.
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purpose of a stalking statute, even when the stalker does not intend
for the victim to view it or allow her to view it on his page.207  In
Craig, the statute was specific enough for courts to interpret it in this
manner.  Illinois should adopt this interpretation by implementing a
specific social media component into the law.208
Although Illinois courts have not decided whether a personal post
on a social media site can constitute “contact” or “sending” for the
purpose of the Statute, it is likely that if a case were to arise, the court
would likely hold that those posts do constitute “contact.”209  If a de-
fendant were to post a threatening message on his Facebook page con-
cerning someone else (not a Facebook friend), Illinois courts may be
inclined to follow the reasoning in O’Leary and determine that the
message constitutes indirect contact.  Because technology is constantly
changing, it is the duty of the legislature to keep up and amend or
update existing laws.210  If the Illinois General were to adopt this in-
terpretation of contact in terms of violating the Statute, it would be
their obligation to ensure that defendants are put on notice.  This
means that the General Assembly would need to update the current
Statute with a specific social media component that addresses not only
direct versus indirect contact, but also contact that might occur on a
private social media page.
In O’Leary, even when a defendant was not friends with the victim,
the court still held his communication to be contact.211  The distinction
between Facebook friend verses Facebook user is important, espe-
cially when dealing with violations of an order of protection.212  If the
defendant’s Facebook page is private, and he is not Facebook friends
with the victim, the victim cannot through her own Facebook page,
see anything the defendant posts.  It is possible that the defendant
might not even intend to communicate his private posts to the victim.
By holding that all private posts on Facebook constitute communicat-
ing with every user on the Facebook network, the court seems to be
taking an insurmountable leap to impute liability on the defendant.213
207. Id.at 566.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., O’Leary v. Florida, 109 So. 3d 874, 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
210. Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology, MIT TECH. REV.
(Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.technologyreview.com/view/526401/laws-and-ethics-cant-keep-pace-
with-technology/ (“The gaps are getting wider as technology advances ever more rapidly.  And
it’s not just in employment and lending—the same is happening in every domain that technology
touches.”).
211. O’Leary, 109 So. 3d at 877.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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Regardless of whether Facebook is really “private,” the defendant
in O’Leary did not intend for the victim to view his comments.214  He
did not intend to communicate with all Facebook users.215  The court
was essentially trying to equate his behavior to that of someone stand-
ing on a street corner holding up a sign containing a nasty comment
concerning a victim.216  Because social media sites like Facebook have
become so commonplace, it is important for the legislature to take
that into account and amend the Statute to ensure that defendants are
aware of what would constitute communication via social media.
D. Is the Statute Valid?
The Statute, as written, is vague and it therefore violates a defen-
dant’s right to due process.217  A statute is void for vagueness if it
“fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportu-
nity to know what is prohibited.”218  The void-for-vagueness doctrine
is used when the statutory standards are so undefined that courts
“cannot apply a criminal statute without engaging in common law
rulemaking.”219
As it currently stands, a course of conduct is defined as any acts in
which a defendant “directly, indirectly or through third parties . . .
follows, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens or communicates to or
about” the petitioner.220  Although the Statute mentions “electronic”
communication,221 it can be argued that posting on a “private” social
media website, in which the petitioner is not able to view, does not
constitute communicating.  The Statute appears to be broad and all
214. Id. at 875.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. O’Leary, 109 So. 3d at 495–96.
218. Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1019–20 (2013) (quoting Hunt v. City of Los
Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 712 (9th Cir. 2011)).  A statute is only facially void for vagueness if it is
vague “not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but
comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is speci-
fied at all.” Id. at 1020.
219. Brian Slocum, RICO and the Legislative Supremacy Approach to Federal Criminal Law-
making, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 639, 640 (2000).  The Supreme Court has indicated approval of
related doctrines.  In United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997), the Court described the “three
related manifestations of the fair warning requirement” of due process. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266
(explaining that to prevail on a vagueness challenge, the challenger must demonstrate that: (1) a
person of ordinary intelligence would not have a reasonable opportunity to understand what
conduct the statute prohibits; or (2) the statute authorizes or encourages arbitrary enforcement).
220. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266.
221. Id.
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encompassing, including communication “directly or indirectly” and
“through third parties.”222  However, that language is vague.
The Statute is vague because it does not include the words “social
media.”223  Because the Fourteenth Amendment224 provides defend-
ants with due process, they must be put on notice with unambiguous
language that any communication via a social media outlet can and
will subject them to jurisdiction under the Statute.  This would clarify
the “electronic communication” element by specifically addressing the
social media component.  The Statute also does not have a mens rea
requirement.  In Relerford, the court specifically noted that, as cur-
rently written, the Statute contains a reasonable person standard and
no requirement that defendant actually intend to inflict emotional suf-
fering on a person.225  The reasonable person standard in a criminal
statute is unconstitutional.226  There is no statute defining the term
“reasonable person” in stalking or harassment criminal offenses.227
Therefore, the Statute should focus on the intent of the perpetrator
rather than the impact on the victim.  It should also establish a clear
mens rea element and avoid any infringement on a defendant’s due
process rights.
The question that remains is whether or not a reasonable person
would understand that the Statute prohibits Facebook users from
posting information concerning victims on their own private page.228
Social media sites that provide “privacy tools” give users a false sense
of security.229  Many social network users assume some degree of pri-
vacy within their circle of friends.230  However, whether Facebook
users are aware that this is a false sense of security is the question at
issue.231
E. Facebook Lacks Privacy
When people in relationships break up and start posting nasty
things about their ex-partner on their own Facebook page, they can-
not expect those posts to be private.232  Even though Facebook has
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
225. Relerford v. United States, 56 N.E.3d 489, 496 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
226. Id. at 495–96.
227. Id. at 495.
228. Id.
229. See Ozer, supra note 3. R
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put “privacy” features in place, those features give the average user a
false sense of security.233  In order to prevent potential stalking de-
fendants from violating the Statute by posting information related to
the victim, the Illinois General Assembly needs to ensure that it
clearly addresses the ramifications if the defendant posts anything re-
lating to the victim on any social media outlet, regardless of whether
their account is private.
Many people who post things on their “private” Facebook page ex-
pect that whatever they post will remain confidential.234  Unfortu-
nately, that is not the case.235  Although Facebook’s privacy policy
claims to limit the availability of its user’s information to third parties,
it also states that Facebook may “access, preserve, and share” that
information in response to a legal request, to address fraud, or to
“protect” itself.”236  Facebook’s privacy statement is extremely broad
and all encompassing.237  However, under the Third Party Doctrine,
anything posted on Facebook, or social media in general, is subject to
seizure by the government.238  The Third Party Doctrine is the Fourth
Amendment rule that governs the collection of evidence from third
parties in criminal investigations.239  The rule is simple: “By disclosing
to a third party, the subject gives up all of his Fourth Amendment
rights in the information revealed.”240  Pursuant to Smith v. Maryland,
the Fourth Amendment does not apply to information held by a third
parties like Facebook.241  In Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court extended
the Third Party Doctrine to include information voluntarily disclosed
to automated machines.242  The court held that government only
233. Ozer, supra note 3. R
234. Danielle Matterson, Is My Facebook Page Really Private?, STONEHAM PATCH (Mar. 5,
2014, 3:49 PM), http://patch.com/massachusetts/stoneham/is-my-facebook-page-really-private.
235. Id.




239. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 743–45; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
242. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744; see also Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why
the Third Party Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV 1, 3 (2013).  According to Professor
Bedi,
A thirty-year old opinion, Smith remains the reigning precedent to explain communica-
tions transmitted over the Internet. Because Internet communications are also volunta-
rily disclosed to machines in the form of ISPs, arguably under Smith users appear to
lose any Fourth Amendment protection in these communications.  The government
would therefore be constitutionally free to acquire these communications from the
third-party service provider without first obtaining a warrant, and to use the informa-
tion against a person at trial.
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needs a subpoena to obtain your personal information held by third
parties, like Facebook.243  The reasoning in Smith244 can be directly
applied to social media.  The Court essentially states that social media
users do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when posting
things on third party websites.245
The Facebook generation, as it has come to be known, is commonly
used to “identify those who are growing up in a world where the use
of online social networking is common.”246  Many Facebook users
tend to post hundreds of statuses detailing their daily routine, pictures
of what their day consists of, and the current status of their romantic
relationships.247  Social media has fundamentally changed the way we
communicate.248  Years ago, technology did not give people the op-
portunity to interact with others the way it does today.249  People had
to go outside their comfort zones to meet new people.250  Social
networking sites, on the other hand, allow people to simply open the
app on their smart phone and stare at what their family members or
friends are doing for hours.  Social media has virtually done away with
face-to-face interaction.251  It allows people to “socialize” behind a
computer screen.252
Because social media has become ubiquitous, social media users
have a false sense of security when it comes to privacy.253  What some-
one from the Pre-Facebook Generation may view as “contact,” cur-
rent active Facebook users may not.254  Moreover, active Facebook
users may reasonably expect that information they post on their “pri-
Id. at 3.
243. Smith, 422 U.S. at 745–46.
244. Id. at 744.
245. See Bedi, supra note 242. R
246. What Is the Facebook Generation?, WISE GEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-the-
facebook-generation.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2017).
247. Nick Bente, What It Means to Be Part of the Facebook Generation, THOUGHT CATALOG
(July 10, 2014), http://thoughtcatalog.com/nick-bente/2014/07/what-it-means-to-be-part-of-the-
facebook-generation/.
248. Chelsea Bates, The Dangers of Social Networking Sites, COMMONPLACE (2009), http://
www.mhlearningsolutions.com/commonplace/index.php?qNode/5582.
249. Dan Schwable, Where Would You Be Today Without Social Media Tools?, LIFE HACK,
http://www.lifehack.org/articles/communication/where-would-you-be-today-without-social-med
ia-tools.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
250. Id.
251. See Bates, supra note 248. R
252. Id.
253. See Ozer, supra note 3. R
254. Anick Jesdanun, Facebook Resisters, Why Some Just Refuse to Join, ASSOC. PRESS (May
17, 2012), http://www.thestar.com/business/2012/05/17/facebook_resisters_why_some_just_refuse
_to_join_the_social_network.html.
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vate” accounts remains private.255  Given the fact that Facebook pro-
vides privacy controls, it seems reasonable for users to have some sort
of privacy expectation.256  In order to prevent the Statute from being
declared vague, the Illinois General Assembly should add a section
that specifically deals with social media.
Social media has become a powerful tool for dispensing threats.257
Many social media users utilize Facebook and other online forums as
their own personal journal.258  Some users confide in their Facebook
friends and sometimes post emotional comments that may or may not
be a reflection of their true intentions.259
In Elonis, the United States Supreme Court held that the prosecu-
tion needed to show that the defendant intended the posts to be
threats.260  This holding was controversial, especially for victims of do-
mestic violence.261  Many people believe that when it comes to domes-
tic violence or stalking, law enforcement should err on the side of
caution.262  However, this is the United States of America and citizens
have constitutional rights, particularly freedom of speech.263  The
Court explained that an objective reasonable person standard would
not go far enough to separate innocent, accidental conduct from pur-
poseful, wrongful acts.264  The holding in Elonis is especially impor-
tant when deciding whether or not to amend the Statute.265
Currently, the Statute does not incorporate a mens rea element under
the course of conduct section.266  As the Statute is currently written,
consider for example that a defendant can post threatening rap lyrics
on his Facebook page regarding the victim and be in violation of his
order, regardless of whether or not he intended to pursue the
255. See Ozer, supra note 3. R
256. Id.
257. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Case Tests the Limits of Free Speech on Facebook and
Other Social Media, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/su-
preme-court-case-tests-the-limits-of-free-speech-on-facebook-and-other-social-media/2014/11/
23/9e54dbd8-6f67-11e4-ad12-3734c461eab6_story.html.
258. Why Your Journal Is Better than Facebook’s Timeline, EASY JOURNALING (Oct. 2011),
http://www.easyjournaling.com/2011/10/why-your-journal-is-better-than-facebooks-timeline/.
259. Dave Ursillo, The Folly of Venting in Public, DAVE URSILLO BLOG, https://www.daveur-
sillo.com/the-folly-of-venting-in-public/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2017).
260. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2003 (2015).
261. Soraya Chemaly & Mary Anne Franks, Supreme Court May Have Made Online Abuse
Easier, TIME (June 3, 2015), http://time.com/3903908/supreme-court-elonis-free-speech/.
262. Id.
263. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
264. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2003.
265. Id.
266. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.5 (2014); Mens Rea–A Defendant’s Mental State, FIN-
DLAW, http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-law-basics/mens-rea-a-defendant-s-mental-state.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2017).
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threats.267  If the Illinois General Assembly decides to incorporate a
social media component into the Statute, it should also include the
mens rea requirement.268  Without that requirement, defendant’s con-
stitutional rights will be at risk.269
The vagueness of the Statute not only detrimentally affects victims
of stalking, but it also puts the constitutional rights of defendants in
jeopardy.270  The Statute should be amended to ensure that those
threats are included within the “electronic communication” section
because social media has become a powerful tool for dispensing
threats.271  Respondents to stalking orders may use social media as a
personal journal private from the rest of the world.
A “reasonable person” might believe that private social media
profiles are, in fact, private.272  However, if the Statute was clear and
left no room for questioning, defendants would be on notice that any-
thing they post on social media can be used against them.273  A clear
statute would incorporate social media and privacy features into the
language.274  For example, the Statute would list social media as a
form of electronic communication.275  The Statute would further state
that this section applies to any and all posts to social media websites,
including private posts.276
IV. IMPACT
Stalking is a serious and relevant problem for countless victims na-
tionwide.277  Victims of stalking need to know that they will be pro-
tected from all forms of stalking, whether direct, indirect, in person or
online.  Equally important is the need to put defendants on notice to
protect their due process rights.  Resolving the vague components of
this Statute will absolutely ensure that both victims and defendants
are protected.  Although an amendment may not solve the problem of
cyberstalking, it will give victims an outlet to voice their concerns and
pursue justice.
267. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005.
268. See Mens Rea–A Defendant’s Mental State, supra note 266. R
269. Note, Constitutionality of Criminal Statutes Containing No Requirement of Mens Rea, 24
IND. L.J. 89, 89 (1948).
270. Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1019 (2013).






277. See Levin, supra note 23. R
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A. Impact on Victims
Social media facilitates stalking.278  Sites like Facebook, Twitter, and
Myspace allow users to anonymously search through personal pages
and essentially monitor what others are doing.279  Because social me-
dia has become part of the “norm,” the Illinois General Assembly
needs to ensure that stalking legislation is keeping up with advance-
ments in technology.280  The Illinois General Assembly can help pro-
tect victims of cyberstalking by implementing a specific social media
component into the Statute.
Social media can help facilitate stalking because it is a popular
mode of communicating directly with others in today’s society.281
Each and every day, millions of people sign-in to sites like Facebook
and Twitter to communicate with others.282  This instant form of com-
munication makes it easier for stalkers to stalk their victims.283  It is
important that those victims are protected.284  In order to ensure that
they are protected, the Illinois General Assembly needs to update the
Statute to include communication via social media.  This will guaran-
tee that all social media users are aware that anything they post on
their “personal” webpage is not private and can be used against them
in a court of law.285
B. Impact on Defendants
Clear and all-encompassing cyberstalking legislation will ensure
that a defendant’s procedural due process rights are guaranteed.  De-
fendants are entitled to a constitutionally adequate procedure when
the government aims to rescind one of their liberties.  As it stands
now, an Illinois appellate court has declared a portion of the Statute
unconstitutional for lack of a mens rea component.  Therefore, it is
vital that the legislature make a swift and concise change to the law.
By instituting a requirement that the defendant actually intend to in-
278. See Bennett, supra note 182. R
279. Nicholas Tufnell, 21 Tips, Tricks and Shortcuts to Help You Stay Anonymous Online,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/06/tips-tricks-
anonymous-privacy.





283. McGauley, supra note 161. R
284. McKinney, supra note 280. R
285. See Jamie White, Your Facebook Wall Is Not Private, PODLEGAL, http://www.podlegal
.com.au/your-facebook-wall-is-not-private/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
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flict emotional suffering on a person, the General Assembly will pro-
tect the due process rights of the defendants.
C. Impact on Freedom of Speech
The General Assembly has two options to reconstruct the Statute.
It can impose specific social media components into the law, which
include a mens rea requirement, or explicitly restrict certain avenues
of social media from the Statute.  Instituting a strict social media com-
ponent to the law may violate the defendant’s First Amendment right
to freedom of speech.286  Specifically, when a defendant is posting in-
formation on his private account, his speech may be protected under
the First Amendment.287
In Elonis, the Supreme Court held that there must be a subjective
intent behind the alleged threatening communication.288  This subjec-
tive intent requirement separates wrongful conduct from innocent
conduct.289  By instituting a strict social media component, the Gen-
eral Assembly might hinder the defendant’s right to free speech and
subsequently misconstrue his intentions.  If the defendant posts a mes-
sage about the victim on his private Facebook page, he is not contact-
ing the victim.  His actions could not constitute direct or indirect
contact because he is not actively trying to send the message to the
victim.290  The victim would have to go out of her way to view the
message,291 and the only way this situation could constitute a violation
of the Statute would be if the defendant solicited someone to relay the
message to the victim.292  That would constitute indirect contact and
he would be in violation of the Statute.293  In that situation, the defen-
dant is going out of his way to reach the victim which is completely
different than posting a message on his private page in which he is not
friends with the victim and has no intentions of having the victim see
his message.294
D. Plans for the Future
If the Illinois General Assembly institutes a strict social media as-
pect to the current Statute, constitutional violations are bound to oc-
286. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
287. Id.
288. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015).
289. Id. at 2011.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 2017.
292. Id.
293. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.5 (2014).
294. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008.
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cur.295  The legislature can add a section to the Statute that specifically
addresses social media.  This section would protect the due process
rights of the defendant by putting him on notice that intentional con-
tact via social media would constitute a violation.296  The mens rea
requirement is vital to ensuring the statue is carried out properly and
void of any constitutional violations.  The contact must be initiated by
the defendant with the intent of conveying the message to the victim.
E. Impact of Stalking
The impact of stalking may vary depending on the different circum-
stances that apply to the situation.297  Stalking can have a tremendous
impact on the victim’s mental and physical health.298  Victims often
report feeling fearful of being alone or harmed again in the future.
Many victims often report feelings of depression and difficulty sleep-
ing,299 and some victims never feel a sense of normalcy after being
stalked.300
Recently, Erin Andrews, a famous sports broadcaster, came for-
ward discussing how her experience as a victim of stalking has se-
verely impacted her life.301  In 2008, Andrews was staying at the
Marriot Nashville while covering a football game.302  Her stalker,
Michael Berret, checked into the room next to her and tampered with
the peephole attached to her hotel door.303  He then shot a video of
her changing her clothes and posted it on the internet.304  During the
trial, Andrews explained how the release of the video has impacted
295. Id.
296. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.5.
297. Impact of Stalking on Victims, STALKING RISK PROFILE, https://www.stalkingriskprofile
.com/victim-support/impact-of-stalking-on-victim (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).  The impact of stalk-
ing may vary according to the victim’s characteristics, past experience, current circumstances,




301. Natalie Finn, Erin Andrews’ Case Is a Reminder of How Difficult It Is for Sex Crime






\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-3\DPL302.txt unknown Seq: 33 13-SEP-17 13:03
2017] ILLINOIS CYBERSTALKING STATUTE 933
her life.305  Her testimony was powerful and is a good example of the
pain and despair that victims of stalking may face.306
The General Assembly needs to ensure that victims like Andrews
are protected from harassment via social media.  By implementing a
social media section into the Statute, victims will have the protection
that they need.307  Many social media users fail to realize that posting
on personal accounts and posting “private” information concerning
the victim may constitute contact, so a section directly addressing so-
cial media would address those concerns.308  Although no case law on
stalking order violations exists in Illinois, the broad consensus among
different jurisdictions is that almost any type of contact, direct or indi-
rect, will constitute a violation.309  Like in New Hampshire v. Craig,
even though the defendant did not communicate directly with the vic-
tim, he was still held in violation of the order.310
The failure to implement these changes would have the greatest im-
pact on the victims.311  As the law currently stands, social media is not
addressed at all.312  Although “electronic communication” is men-
tioned, it is not clear what constitutes electronic, let alone “communi-
cation.”313  Therefore, victims that feel violated by a communication
done via social media may not have a viable claim in court.314  This
would leave them susceptible to online harassment, cyberstalking, and
overall insecurity.315
If the Illinois General Assembly implements a social media compo-
nent to the Statute, it will clear up potential litigation issues and give
everyone a stronger sense of security.  Defendants will be put on no-
tice of the possible violations that can occur when using social media
websites, be those private or public.316  In addition, victims will also be
protected because they will be able to come to court and bring a viola-
305. Id. (“The day that I got the phone call that this was on the Internet, I didn’t want to get
undressed. I didn’t change my clothes for two or three days. I was so screwed up. I was disgusted
with myself; I was disgusted with my body, with being naked, and that everybody saw that it was
me.”).
306. Id.
307. Finn, supra note 301. R
308. See Quarmby, supra note 192. R
309. See New Hampshire v. Craig, 112 A.3d 559, 566 (N.H. 2015); see also O’Leary v. Florida,
109 So. 3d 874, 878 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)
310. See Craig, 112 A.3d at 566.
311. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. R
312. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.5.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. US Laws, HALT ABUSE, http://www.haltabuse.org/resources/laws/ (last visited Mar. 1,
2017).
316. Id.
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tion if they feel the Statute was violated via social media.317  Overall,
in order to get with the times and ensure the safety and well-being of
its citizens, the Illinois General Assembly should address and imple-
ment a clear and concise social media component to the Statute.318
V. CONCLUSION
Stalking legislation in Illinois needs to be updated to ensure that
victims are protected from cyberstalking done via social media and
that defendants constitutional rights are not violated.  If the General
Assembly conducts thorough research on the topic of cyberstalking, it
will find that it has become a huge problem throughout the years.319
The problem with the current law is that social media is not ad-
dressed at all.320  Although the Statute does mention “electronic com-
munication,” many social media users would not consider personal
posts on social media to be considered “communication.”321
The Illinois General Assembly should implement a strict social me-
dia component as soon as possible and take a proactive approach to
avoid future legislation.  In doing so, defendants will be put on notice.
Furthermore, victims of stalking will have a form of redress for cyber-
stalking abuse.  By taking a proactive approach to closing loopholes in
the Statute, Illinois will be on board with many other states.  Amend-
ing the Statute will be a fair and effective method of reform that is




319. See Stalking, CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING, http://www.popcenter.org/
problems/stalking/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
320. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.5 (2014).
321. Id.
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